Abstract Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap's The Revision Theory of Truth presents revision theoretic systems of circular definitions. Part I of the present paper shows that the revision theories S # and S* are not axiomatisable. Part II refines this result. Among other things, Part II shows that there is a strong relationship between revision theories and the theory of inductive definitions. This relationship is exploited to show that S # and S* (and all "plausible" revision theories of circular definitions) are of complexity at least Π^.
and S*. It provides axiomatisations (in a sense) of the S n , but not of S # and S*. More precisely, it provides sound and complete calculuses C n for the S n such that, for every set 3D of definitions and for every formula B, B is a theorem of C n (relative to 3D) iff B is valid (on 3D) in S n . But it provides no such calculuses for S # and S*. Indeed, regarding S # , [2] A similar open problem exists for S*. The present paper largely closes these open problems. We provide a finite set, 3D, of definitions, and we show that the following sets are not recursively enumerable (indeed, the set of true arithmetical sentences is recursively embeddable into them): The Main Result suffices to establish that there is no complete calculus for either S # or S*. Suppose that there were a complete calculus for S # . Then, since our set 3D is finite, we could use the calculus to recursively enumerate [A: A is valid on 3D in S # j. But this cannot be done. Similarly for S*. The Main Result also partially answers the second question in [2] 's Problem 5D.7. Suppose we are looking for a minimal complexity, C, such that for all sets 3D of definitions the complexity of the set of valid sentences (relative to that of 3D) is at most C. Then C is at least the complexity of true arithmetic (which is A}).
The present paper is divided into two parts. Part I (Sections 2-5) establishes the Main Result. (Part I assumes much the same background as does [2] .) Part II (Sections 6-10) refines the Main Result. (In Part II, Sections 6, 7, and 10 assume the same background as Part I, and Sections 8 and 9 assume some familiarity with the analytic hierarchy.) Section 6 sharpens the Main Result by using a single circular definition rather than the two circular definitions of Part I. Section 7 generalises the Main Result to other "plausible" revision theories. Section 8 investigates the relationship between revision theories and the theory of inductive definitions-a relationship which can be brought out by generalising the construction used in Part I. This relationship helps us improve upon the Main Result: the lower bound for the complexity of S # and S* is raised to Π2 (Corollary 17). Section 9 proves the main lemma used in proving Corollary 17. And Section 10 discusses [2] 's theories of truth, T # and T*, which are based on S # and S*. Throughout this paper, we assume all of the terminology and notation of [2] with one exception: where [2] uses script S (for revision sequences), we use bold-italic S(S).
Part I The Main Result

Preliminaries
Let L be the first-order language of arithmetic, with the following nonlogical constants: a name, 0; a unary function symbol, ' binary func-tion symbols, + and x; and a binary relation symbol, <. Let 3D be the set consisting of the following two definitions:
The upshot of these definitions is made explicit in Section 3, where we note the behaviour of the revision rule δ^t M and of revision sequences for &O,M> when M is in a particular class of models soon to be specified. First, let AX be the sentence which says that < is a strict linear order, that 0 is the <-smallest element, and that x' is indeed the immediate successor of x (see [2] , Example 5A.17, p. 154):
We say that a model M of L is an ^4^-model iff it satisfies AX. (A good example is the set of natural numbers with the standard interpretation of the nonlogical constants.) We are interested in the behaviour of δ& tM (and of its revision sequences) when M is an ^IX-model. In our discussion below, if M = <D, I> is a model of L, we write,
for <d!,d 2 > G I(<); and 0 for 1(0).
Finally, given a hypothesis, h, we define h(G) to be [d G D : h(G,d) = t}, and h(H) to be {d G D : h(H,d) = t).
Before we move on to the behaviour of 6© iM , some definitions.
Definition 1
where ' occurs n times. Finally, N M is the smallest '-complete set containing 0. (That is, N M = {O^O'^iT,...}.)
Behaviour ofδ^> M and of revision sequences for δ^M
We prove Lemmas 2-5 in Section 4.
Lemma 2
Suppose that M = <D,I> is an AX-model and that h is a hypothesis. Then
Lemma 3
Suppose that M = <D,I> is an AX-model and that his a hypothesis. Then
(i) */ h(G) is a non-empty '-complete initial segment, then δ^f M (h)(H) = h(G); and (ii) otherwise, δ^M(h)(H) = h(H).
Lemma 4
Suppose that M = <D,I> is an AX-model and that S is a revision sequence for δz> iM . Then 
Lemma 5
Suppose that M = <D,I> is an AX-model and that S is a revision sequence for δ£> fM Then
Corollary 6
Suppose that
Proof: By Lemma 5 (ii).
Proofs of Lemmas 2-5
For these proofs, we introduce four abbreviations. 
Proof of Lemma 5: (i) This follows from Lemma 4(iii) and Lemma 3(i). (ii) This
Proof of the main result
Let N = <ω,I ω > be the standard model of arithmetic. N is clearly a model of AX. N is also a model of the sentence PA~ where PA~ is the sentence formed by universally closing all of the Peano axioms other than the axioms of induction, and then conjoining them. Indeed, we have the following. (We omit the proof.)
Lemma 7
Suppose that M = <D,I> is an AX-model such that
Our main lemma is Lemma 8.
Lemma 8
For every formula B of L,
Proof: Before we state the Main Result (Corollary 10), we give a definition which makes it precise.
Definition 9
Suppose that A Q X and B g Y, where each of X and Y is either the set of natural numbers or the set of formulas of a language whose syntax can be recursively arithmetised. A is recursively embeddable in B iff, for some 1-1 recursive function f : X -• Y, and for all x E X, x G A iff f(x) E B.
Corollary 10 (The Main Result)
The
set of true arithmetic sentences is recursively embeddable in [A: A is valid on 3D in S # } and in [A: A is valid on 3D on S*}.
Proof: Let f be the following function on the set of formulas of L:
Then, by Lemma 8, B is a truth of arithmetic iff f(B) is valid on 3D in S # iff f (B) is valid on 3D in S*.
As noted in Section 1, the non-axiomatisability of S # and S* (and indeed that their complexity is at least Δ}) follows from Corollary 10.
Part II Refinements 6 Using one definition instead of two
Though our set 3D of definitions contains circular definitions for two predicates, we can alter our proof so that the Main Result applies to the S # and S* theories of a single definition (of a unary predicate). The trick is to define a unary predicate F whose behaviour on the odd numbers does the job of G and whose behaviour on the even numbers does the job of H. In order to make the distinction between even and odd numbers precise, we assume that we are working in models of (AX& PA~) rather than in models of AX. We use two abbreviations:
(Λ: is even) abbreviates (3w)(x = (0" x w)); and (Λ: is odd) abbreviates -(3w)(x = (0" x w)).
The definition of Fx is:
The analogue to Lemma 8 is the following. For every formula B of L,
So the complexity of the S # and S* theories of a single definition of (a unary predicate) is at least that of arithmetic (which is Δ}).
7 Other revision theories S # and S* are not the only plausible revision theories for sets of circular definitions. And (as pointed out by Gupta in correspondence) our results apply to any plausible such theory, since our proofs do not rely on the special features of S # and S*. The idea guiding S*, the simplest revision theory, is this (where we fix a model M and a set 3D of definitions): the valid sentences are those which come out stably true in every On-long (where On is the class of ordinals) revision sequence (for δ£> >M ). More precisely, given the α th stage in a revision sequence S, we can use the hypothesis S a to evaluate the truth values of the sentences. This results in an evaluation sequence of assignments of truth-values to sentences. So the idea guiding S* is this: the valid sentences are those which come out stably true in every On-long evaluation sequence.
We can liberalise the idea guiding S* (see [2] , p. 168). One way is to restrict our attention to some subfamily of the On-long revision sequences-those considered somehow well-behaved. And so we might not insist that, in order for a sentence to be valid, the sentence to stably true in all evaluation sequences, but only in the well-behaved ones. Another strategy is not to restrict the family of revision sequences, but to weaken the insistence that, in order to be valid, a sentence be stably true (in all On-long evaluation sequences). In S # , for example, the valid sentences are those which come out nearly stably true ( [2] , Definition 5C.5, p. 169) in every On-long evaluation sequence.
However we liberalise the idea guiding S*, this much seems certain: being stably true in all evaluation sequences ought to be a sufficient (if not a necessary) condition for validity. This motivates clause (5) of Definition 11, below. The other clauses are motivated by more general concerns. We do not provide a precise definition of the concept of a revision theory S. We assume that S is based on On-long revision sequences, and is guided by a liberalised version of idea guiding S*. And we assume that some definition has been given for "A is valid on 3D in M in S", and that A is valid on 3D in S iff, for every model M (of the language L) A is valid on 3D in M in S.
Definition 11
A revision theory S is plausible iff, for every model M (of the original language) and every set 3D of definitions and every sentence A (of the original language extended with the definienda): 
Theorem 12
If S is a plausible revision theory then the complexity of S (indeed, the complexity of the S theory of a single definition of a unary predicate)
is at least Δ{.
Remark 13
We can identify a revision theory S with the corresponding threeplace validity relation S(^4,3D,M) = "A is valid on 3D in M in S". Indeed, we can take any three-place relation S = S(^4,3D,M) to be a theory of circular definitions, even if it is in no interesting sense a revision theory. If S = S(^4,3D,M) satisfies conditions (l)-(5) of Definition 11, we say that S is a plausible theory of circular definitions. Given a theory S = S(y4,3D,M) of circular definitions, we say that A is valid on 3D in S iff, for every model M, S(,4,3D,M). The complexity of S (in the sense we are interested in) is the following: the minimal complexity C such that, for all sets 3D of definitions, the complexity of [A: A is valid on 3D in S} (relative to that of 3D) is at most C. The complexity of the S theory of a single definition of a unary predicate is the following: the minimal complexity C such that, for all sets 3D = [D] where D defines a unary predicate, the complexity of {A: A is valid on 3D in S] is at most C. (We can similarly define the complexity of the S theory of finitely many definitions, or of finitely many definitions of unary predicates.) Theorem 12 goes through for any plausible theory S of circular definitions, even if S is in no interesting sense a revision theory. Indeed, all our theorems below concerning plausible revision theories of circular definitions can be generalised to plausible theories of circular definitions.
* Revision-theoretic definitions, and inductive and co-inductive definitions
Gupta has pointed out (in correspondence) that our construction can be generalised to show that every set or relation that is inductively (or co-inductively) definable in a given model is revision-theoretically definable in that model. We can take advantage of this to improve our lower bound for the complexity of S # and S* (and any other plausible revision theory) by raising it from Δj to Π2 (Corollary 17-the hard work is in proving Lemma 16, which we do in Section 9).
Gupta defines a "translation" of any inductive definition into a pair of revision theoretic definitions which have the effect of the original inductive defini- And so, in any plausible revision theory, Hx strongly defines X (in the sense analogous to that of [2] , Definition 5D.18).
Gupta also defines a translation of any co-inductive definition into a pair of revision theoretic definitions which have the effect of the original co-inductive definition. We can define a system S ci of co-inductive definitions analogously to the system Si of inductive definitions, and we can define S ci validity analogously to Sj validity. In S ci the extension of H is given by the greatest fixed point of fyz)},M> & n d we say that this extension is co-inductively defined by D. Suppose that Y is this extension. Gupta notes that we can strongly define Y in any plausible revision theory with the use of the following set £)' of definitions:
The revision process for these definitions yields for H the same interpretation as original definition D, now understood as a co-inductive definition. More precisely, for every revision sequences S for δay )M and for every d E D, d E Y iff <i/,d> is stably t in S, and d £ Y iff <//,d> is stably f in 5.
And so, in any plausible revision theory, Hx strongly defines Y (in the sense analogous to that of [2] , Definition 5D.18).
The Gupta translations immediately yield the following:
Theorem 14
If Sis a plausible revision theory, then the complexity of the S theory of finitely many definitions of unary predicates (and hence the complexity of S) is at least that of the Si(S ci ) theory of a single definition of a unary predicate.
So far we have defined Si-validity when a single positive definition D is given, but [2] defines Si-validity given any (finite or infinite) positive set D of definitions. We could analogously define S ci -validity given any positive set of definitions. Now the Gupta translations can be generalised so as to apply not just to single positive definitions of unary predicates, but to any positive set of definitions. These generalised Gupta translations assign two revision theoretic definitions to each (co-)inductive definition in 3D. These generalised Gupta 
Theorem 15
Suppose
that Sis a plausible revision theory. Then the complexity ofS is at least the complexity o/Si(S ci ). Furthermore, the complexity of the S theory of finitely many definitions is at least the complexity of the Si(S ci ) theory of finitely many definitions.
Lemma 16
The complexity of the S λ theory of finitely many definitions is at least U ι 2 .
Proof: See Section 9.
Corollary 17
Suppose that S is a plausible revision theory. Then the complexity of the S theory of finitely many definitions (and hence the complexity ofS) is at least Π\.
Remark 18
Aldo Antonelli and Vann McGee have independently sketched (very similar) proofs that Ul is an upper as well as a lower bound for the complexity of S # and S*. The idea is to produce, in the language of second-order arithmetic, a Π2 formula with two free variables £) and B, which says that the formula B is a consequence of the set S) of definitions. A Lόwenheim-Skolem argument like that for [2] , Theorem 5C.15, is needed to show that the only domain we need is the domain of natural numbers. Antonelli is currently working on the details of this. Such a result is probably not generalisable to all plausible revision theories.
Remark 19
[2] explicitly compares S # and S* to Sj, and notes a number of Si validities which are not S # or S* validities. The conclusion is that "S # and S* are not... generalizations of the system of inductive definitions" (p. 193). In light of the Gupta translations, this conclusion must be rethought. For anything we can define inductively (or co-inductively, for that matter) we can strongly define in S # and in S* (and in any other plausible revision theory).
Problem 20
Is every set which is definable with a single inductive definition also definable with a single revision theoretic definition (rather than a pair of them)?
Remark 21
The Gupta translations are completely general: they are welldefined whether or not the original set of definitions is positive. Also, there has been independent research on non-monotone inductive definitions. This suggests the following.
Conjecture 22
There is an interesting relationship between the behaviour of a non-monotone definition, understood inductively, and the behaviour of its Gupta translate (in S # and in S*). We also note another way, suggested by revision theoretic semantics, of extending the theory of inductive definitions to non-positive sets of inductive definitions. (Similar remarks apply to co-inductive definitions.) For positive sets, 3), of definitions, Si can be thought of as a plausible revision theory, based on the following strategy for liberalising the idea guiding S* (see Section 6): we consider only the 0-beginning revision sequences, i.e., those which begin by assigning the extension 0 to each definiendum. Thus restricting our attention to a subfamily of revision sequences does not require the set of definitions to be positive. And so, given any model M and any set 3) of definitions, we extend Sj as follows: a sentence A is valid in Si on 3) /« M, iff A is stably true in every 0-beginning revision sequence for δ^t M .
Conjecture 23
There are interesting points of contact between Sj (so extended) and the theory of non-monotone inductive definitions.
Proving Lemma 16
(A sketch of this proof was provided by Yiannis Moschovakis in e-mail correspondence.) For the purposes of this section, L is the first-order language of arithmetic (as in Section 2). If n E ω, n is the term of L got by appending n copies of ' to the constant 0. We consider three new unary predicates, Γ, H, and Q. Given a subset S of {Y,H,Q], L U S is the language got by enriching L with the predicates in S. We let M range over models of A is valid on 3) in Si). So suppose that TΓ £ ω is Π2. Then, for some second-order Π} relation P c ω x (p( ω ) (where (P(ω) is the power set of ω), TΓ = {n E ω: (VY Q ω) «n,Y> ί P)}. We now state Moschovakis's "Abstract Kleene Theorem", regarding second-order Π} relations (see Moschovakis [3] , Theorem 8A1, p. 132).
Theorem 24 (Moschovakis)
Every U\ second-order relation on a countable acceptable structure is inductive. As promised, we have shown that, for every Π^ set π c ω , there is a finite positive set 3D of definitions (over the language IU {y}) such that TΓ is recursively embeddable in [A: A is valid on 3D in Sj). This suffices for Lemma 16. [2] bases its theories of truth, T # and T*, on S # and S*. In the theories of truth there is a single circular concept, truth, and it is defined via an infinite set of partial definitions (p. 197). Furthermore, suppose that L is a first-order language which has a "quotation name" (p. 75) Ά 9 for each sentence A of L + (which results by adding the truth predicate TtoL). Then the set of partial definitions is completely determined: it is the set of definitions of the form
Theories of Truth
ΓA'= Ό{ A,
where A is a sentence of L + . Given the special features of T # and T*, our work on S # and S* does not deliver any verdict regarding the complexity of T # and T*. We leave this as an open problem which we now make precise (Problem 32).
Definition 28
If L is a first-order language then L + is the result of adding the truth predicate TtoL.
Definition 29
Suppose ( 
Problem 32
What is the complexity of v£ and of V£?
Remark 33
McGee has pointed out (in correspondence) that Burgess [1] has made some progress toward solving this problem. In particular, let L be the language of arithmetic (as in Section 2) and let N be the standard model of arithmetic (as in Section 6). Furthermore, identify each formula A of L + with it Gόdel number, Gn(^), so that l(Ά') = Gn(A). Burgess [1] shows that VN (which is called "DT") is complete U 
